

The Russia-Ukraine War: Causes, Consequences and Solutions**¹Dana Mohammed Danish Aladdin Sajadi**¹Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, Faculty of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Tishk International University, Erbil, Kurdistan Region, Iraq**Correspondence:** dana.sajadi@tiu.edu.iq**Article Info:****Article History:**

Received: 9 - 11 - 2023

Accepted: 28 - 3 - 2024

Published: 30 - 6 - 2024

To cite this: Sajadi, A. D.M.D. (2024). The Russia-Ukraine war: Causes, consequences and solutions. *Eurasian Journal of Management & Social Sciences*, 5(1), 28–42.
<https://doi.org/10.23918/ejmss.V5i1p28>

DOI: 10.23918/ejmss.V5i1p28

**Abstract**

The Russia-Ukraine War stands out as a significant conflict in modern times, profoundly affecting both regional and global stability. An ongoing war has been taking place between Russia and Ukraine since 2014 because of the Ukrainian revolution with the annexation of Crimea by Russia. On February 24th, 2022, when President Putin declared the special military operation marked the beginning of a full-fledged war in Ukraine. Geopolitically speaking this war has resulted in a significant shift as Russia faces greater isolation and scrutiny from the global community while Ukraine seeks stronger ties with Western powers. Besides that, the conflict has resulted in countless deaths along with millions having been displaced which in turn led to an ongoing humanitarian crisis. The world before and after the military operation will not be the same; several actors are involved in flaming and escalating the situation, which led to one of the worst disasters of the twenty-first century. In this study, the author adopted a qualitative research approach, delving into the intricate causes of the conflict through thematic analysis of a wide range of secondary sources. The research closely examines historical, geopolitical, and ethnic tensions that have played a significant role in escalating hostilities. The central focus of this research is to untangle the intricate web of interests and power dynamics that are influencing the conflict. Hence, the conflict impacts both regional and global geopolitics, affecting the stability of the international system. It highlights the absence and failure of diplomacy in preventing the conflict from escalating.

Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, NATO, United States, Europe, Sanctions

1. Introduction

February 2022 witnessed a significant escalation of the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine leading to a full-scale war. For a long time now there had been rising tensions caused by Russia's annexation of Crimea several years ago and the fighting that occurred subsequently across parts of eastern Ukraine (Ryabushkin, 2022).

Despite an unstable ceasefire agreement which was often breached, Russia used their infantry soldiers together with artillery while crossing over to Ukraine through the border in its massive military attack. The fighting quickly expanded beyond expectations after Ukraine was taken aback by the unexpected assault resulting in heavy loss of life on either side. In response to worldwide criticism of the conflict between them, Russia was hit with penalties whereas Ukraine was provided with military support. Despite attempts at resolution and infrequent fighting in its second year of existence, the conflict remains unstable. Millions of individuals have been impacted by this ongoing conflict significantly. The consequences extend beyond merely local affairs but also have critical geopolitical ramifications globally from food scarcity to energy crises, and refugee emergencies. These root causes contributing to these issues can pose onerous challenges, via altering political/military systems. The strategies employed by countries such as NATO & US are committed in offering an array of supports replete with weapon-provisioning, intelligence assistance, and shipping naval-defense, it has turned the situation into a proxy war with Russia, peace talks and diplomacy were not an option instead the western allies are willing to support the Zelensky government as long as it he continue to fight Moscow to the last Ukrainian soldier.

This crisis is reminiscent of the Cold War era of the late 1950s and 1960s, when the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a tense rivalry that nearly led to World War III. During this time, there were several crises that heightened tensions, including the Berlin crisis from 1958 to 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. The ongoing Ukrainian crisis is similarly dangerous, with the risk of a nuclear accident or incident increasing as the conflict persists. This study aims to explore the historical background of the war and examine the development of the conflict, as well as its consequences for both sides.

1.2 Problem Statement

The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict has led to loss of life as well as damage to infrastructure on both sides. As a result, economic sanctions were imposed against Russia due to their actions in the conflict being condemned by the international community. Despite many ceasefire attempts and conferences for reconciliation between both parties, there are still incidents of volatile conflict arising from each side's periodic launching of hostilities (Arco et al, 2023). The primary cause behind this dispute is an unsettled territorial disagreement involving Crimea as well as backing for pro-Russian separatists present in eastern Ukraine. The conflict's escalation can be attributed to national identity issues alongside political and economic instability as well as historical tensions between Russia and Ukraine. Finding a peaceful solution that addresses these underlying issues is of utmost urgency given that continuing violence and suffering in this region continuously demands global attention. Therefore, the research seeks to examine the root causes of this conflict, the current and future consequences on both sides and globally. In the same vein, this paper aims to address and accomplish the following question and objective:

- Why Russia attacked Ukraine?
- What is the outcome of this war for Russia and the west?
- To find out the motives behind Russia's attack
- To examine the outcome of this war for both Russia and the west

2. Literature Review

2.1 The Russian Dilemma

The conflict has not started actually on the 24th of February but rather a long time before that date, It was bolstered by a variety of grievances, the greatest is Moscow's belief that the West deceived the former Soviet Union by breaking promises; when the Soviet Union collapsed which major contributor to its dissolve was the west promised Mikhail Gorbachev the former and the last leader of the Soviet Union, NATO would not to expand to the east and toward the Russian border (Sarotte, 2014), years later Vladimir Putin again accused the West of ignoring and making false promises In his 2007 speech to the Munich Security Conference, leaving international law wreckage (Traynor, 2007).

The allegation that then-US Secretary of State James Baker failed to keep his promise made to Mikhail Gorbachev about not expanding NATO eastward after German reunification in February

1990 was dismissed consistently by the West, as this was since the commitments were only expressed orally without being noted down in a specific treaty. In essence, the deal which got inked between Russia and Western countries back in September 1990 put restraints solely on Germany resulting in their ability to choose whichever alliance they wanted - leading them later towards joining up with The Atlantic Alliance. (CVCE.eu, 2016).

2.2 The Expansion of NATO

After dissolution of Warsaw Pact and without any definite purpose, NATO still maintained its strength as an organization, and people believed at that point in time that new Russia will swap out old USSR which turned out to be partially incorrect. The West took advantage of Russia's weakened condition during the 90s while Russia worked hard to find a footing within global relations, and corruption was rampant in the country causing a decline in its economy leading to multiple changes aimed at integrating or aligning it with the political West. The alignment of values and interests led to the formation of a strategic partnership (Kozyrev, 2002).

NATO's expansion began with the addition of new countries and a move towards the east. In 1999, NATO experienced its first expansion since World War II, accepting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The reasoning behind this expansion was to ensure greater security for Europe by surrounding sovereign Germany with NATO countries. At the time, Russia was facing internal turmoil, and thus, the enlargement was met with little reaction from Russia. However, a few years later, in 2004, a second round of enlargement took place, with seven more countries, including Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Romania, joining NATO. This round also included Russia's neighbors, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, which triggered some reactions in Moscow.

This was due to the belief that NATO military facilities and armed forces could be brought right up to the Russian border (Gidathubli, 2004). But Putin on the other hand was busy in consolidating Russia's internal affairs and stabilizing the Russian economy so he remained relatively silent, however, since that year, relations between Russia, Europe, and the West have begun to deteriorate. A few years later things got even worse when NATO leaders promised Georgia and Ukraine would eventually become members in 2008 Bucharest summit which it was supported by George Bush open door policy as he said in his speech "NATO's door must remain open to other nations in Europe that share our love for liberty," (David Brunnstrom, 2008). The outcome of this summit contributed very significantly to Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008 and recognized the

independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, Clearly demonstrating to the West that Russia would not tolerate encirclement by NATO member states. According to Asmus, the August War was the beginning of a long chain of events aimed not only at Georgia or a regime change in the country, but also at attempting to undermine European security: “an increasingly nationalist and revisionist Russia was also rebelling against the European system that it felt no longer met its interests and had been imposed on it during a moment of temporary weakness.” (Asmus, 2010).

Since then, President Putin has repeatedly expressed Russia's concerns and intentions publicly, stating that making Ukraine a part of the EU and NATO would create a Western stronghold on Russia's border, which he sees as a direct existential threat (Dawar, 2008). However, the West has largely ignored these concerns and instead continued to support the pro-Western movements and protests, such as the Orange Revolutions. Washington's pursuit of enlargement has resulted in confrontation, rather than cooperation, with Russia, leading to a power struggle between the two sides.

2.3 Orange Revolution

In 2010, Viktor Yanukovich was elected as the fourth president of Ukraine, and he was known for his pro-Russian stance. Accordingly since 2010 Ukraine abandoned the idea of joining NATO and picked an independent position, a \$15 billion counteroffer from Russia was favored by Yanukovich over an EU trade deal leading to heightened tensions in 2013. Anti-government demonstrations sparked by this decision lasted three months and resulted in the deaths of about a hundred people, while the protests in Kiev and Lvov gained momentum with an exponential rise in crowd numbers (BBC, 2013). Eventually, Yanukovich was ousted in a violent revolution coup that was allegedly prompted and organized by the central intelligence agency and involved Washington's involvement. The government was replaced by Petro Poroshenko, who was elected as Ukraine's first president after the coup. Poroshenko was known for his extreme nationalism, pro-Western stance, and anti-Russian sentiment.

One of the actions taken by the new government in Ukraine was to change the constitution and repeal a minority language law, which affected the Russian-speaking ethnic population that constitutes about 30% of Ukraine. This change resulted in Russian-speaking individuals feeling like second-class citizens, as they now required interpreters for everyday business transactions. As

a result, the Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine were discontented with the revolution that had overthrown the president they had helped elect. Taking advantage of the situation, Putin acted against Ukraine and the West by swiftly sending troops and forces to take Crimea. This was made easier as there were already thousands of Russian troops stationed at a naval base in the Crimean port of Sevastopol, and ethnic Russians made up a significant portion, roughly 60%, of Crimea's population, allowing for a swift takeover without facing significant obstacles.

Most people in Ukraine expressed a desire to leave the country. Putin's actions towards Ukraine became more severe and intensified as he attempted to exert enormous pressure on the new government in Kiev to prevent it from aligning with the West against Moscow. He made it clear that he would rather see Ukraine destroyed as a functioning state than allow it to become a Western stronghold on Russia's doorstep (Mearsheimer, 2014). This was highlighted by a large pro-Russian rally and anti-government separatist groups that emerged in Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk regions, collectively known as the Donbas, in March 2014, shortly after the Euromaidan protest movement and the subsequent Revolution of Dignity. These protests coincided with Russia's annexation of Crimea.

2.4 The Minsk Agreements

As stated by Nicolai Petro, the abrupt removal of President Yanukovich disrupted the delicate balance of interests between the Kyiv and Donbas regions in Ukraine. This was perceived as a direct threat to the fundamental interests of Ukrainian citizens who spoke Russian, known as Russophone Ukrainians (Petro, 2015). The Donetsk and Luhansk regions asserted their independence and refused to be governed by what they perceived as a revolutionary junta (ALJAZEERA, 2014). This declaration was met with heavy military attacks initiated by Poroshenko (Marsden, 2014), resulting in a violent conflict between local groups in Donbass, who had formed and financed several paramilitary battalions, and the newly appointed government in Kyiv. This conflict escalated due to the opposing views of the masses, with supporters of the Euromaidan and their opponents in the so-called Anti-Maidan, which largely consisted of pro-Russian East Ukrainians who considered the Euromaidan to be an illegal coup d'état (Malyarenko, 2019).

The violent conflict in East Ukraine saw a significant escalation between the international talks in Geneva on 17 April 2014 and the first and second Minsk Agreements in September 2014 and

February 2015, respectively (Wittke, 2019) . Despite the implications of applying the terms of the agreements, they failed to achieve a peace plan and ceasefire among the warring parties. Furthermore, the Minsk Agreement called for the establishment of local self-government structures in Donetsk and Luhansk, operating under the auspices of a "Ukrainian Law on Special Status" (Group, 2014) .However, this provision was never implemented, and the agreement framework collapsed completely after the battle for Debaltseve in January 2015 brought the system to a halt. As a result, a subsequent round of talks took place in the Normandy Group, comprising Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and France. This diplomatic meeting, held on February 12, 2015, was based on a package of measures known as Minsk II (Parezanović, 2022).

During this meeting, Presidents Putin, Hollande, Poroshenko, and former chancellor Angela Merkel, along with representatives from international organizations, negotiated an updated, formal, and structured political settlement for a peace agreement in East Ukraine. According to President Putin, Ukraine's refusal to engage in direct talks with representatives from the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) complicated the already challenging negotiations. This dilemma persisted for years, and both agreements only resulted in a reduction in the intensity of the conflict. However, Kyiv's preferred outcome would have been the reintegration of Donbass, which led to their reluctance to make concessions regarding autonomy for the region and denial of rights for Russian-speaking minorities in eastern Ukraine. Instead, the government in Kyiv carried out attacks against the people of Donbass. Prior to the Russian military involvement, Ukraine had been embroiled in a war for eight years which caused the deaths of around 14,000 individuals, including children, and displaced roughly 1.5 million people (Group, 2022) (world, 2022).

Even prior to Russia's military intervention, the situation in Ukraine can be described as genocidal, as the Kiev government carried out attacks against ethnic Russians with the intent of annihilating them partially due to their ethnicity (Kovalik, 2022). Despite attempts by Western media and propaganda to distort these facts, they remain undeniable and are a major root cause of the current crisis in Ukraine. These facts were covered by popular Western press and mainstream media before they became biased and inconvenient to do so, as various technologies, media, social platforms, and press are being recruited for the purpose of demonizing Russia and setting the international community against it.

As reported by Reuters, neo-Nazi battalions have been integrated into the official Ukrainian army and police forces, effectively becoming state or quasi-state entities. These right-wing militias, such as Azov, promote antagonism and hatred towards ethnic Russians, and have been responsible for terrorizing, killing, and displacing them (Cohen, 2018). Despite attempts at diplomatic resolution in 2019, the civil war in Ukraine has persisted.

3. Research Methodology

This research utilized a qualitative method to analyze diverse secondary sources including academic literature from reputable journals as well as news articles sourced from various government agencies. With a focus on identifying key themes and patterns associated with the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, we employed a thematic analysis approach in this study. Careful selection ensured that only relevant and reliable data sources were used to give a comprehensive overview of the conflict from multiple viewpoints with different opinions.

The method of analysis used for this set of data involved taking a deductive approach by identifying themes and patterns through our knowledge of the existing literature on conflict as well as our research questions. Supplementing the analysis with inductive reasoning led to emerging of fresh patterns along with new ideas during evaluation.

Overall, the qualitative thematic analysis approach was chosen as it allowed for a detailed and nuanced understanding of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, identifying key themes and patterns that may inform policy decisions and future research in the field.

4. Findings

4.1 War of Attrition

Since the start of the Russian military operation on February 24th, the intensity of the war in Ukraine has steadily increased. Initially, President Putin may have believed that he could achieve his objectives quickly, as he had done in Georgia in 2008 when it took only five days to gain control over the Russian-backed regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, the situation in Ukraine proved to be different. The Russian army faced various obstacles and challenges in their efforts to conquer Ukrainian territories, and the Kremlin seemed to have miscalculated the situation.

One of the challenges faced by the Russian troops was logistical difficulties while operating in the disputed conflict territories within Ukraine. They encountered issues with fuel supply for their vehicles and machines, as well as limited access to rail and convenient roads, resulting in vehicles being jammed and unable to move. In addition to that this caused difficulties in providing other army units with the necessary ammunition and spare parts. Also worth noting is that because Ukraine has such an expansive territory (second only to Russia among European countries), it was very challenging for the Russian military when attempting to invade Kiev and capture control over all of Ukraine. Despite the odds against it, Russia has managed to gain possession over nearly a fourth of Ukrainian territory primarily in Donbass and Luhansk located in the east, and the ongoing war is now in its second year as of the time when I am writing this paper. On the contrary, the Western countries underestimated the strength of the Russian army, despite its reputation as one of the most powerful in the world, and assumed it would not perform as effectively.

The size of the Russian army, along with its advanced tanks, aircraft, and technology, was not properly evaluated by the West, and it did not meet their expectations. This misconception served as one of the main reasons for the continued support and solidarity shown by Western countries towards Ukraine. As a result, the Western countries made sure to provide the Ukrainian army with advanced weapons, rockets, and drones, in addition to funding them with billions of dollars to sustain the ongoing fight. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, which has been monitoring global aid commitments to Ukraine since the conflict began in February, the United States has pledged over \$23 billion in military assistance to Ukraine. The United Kingdom has pledged \$3.7 billion, Germany has pledged \$1.4 billion, and Poland has pledged \$1.8 billion (Tracker, 2022).

The primary motive behind the support and funding provided to Ukraine was to weaken Russia's army and economy by prolonging the war until the fall of Putin's regime. From the very beginning of the crisis, a language of weaponry and military support dominated the discourse, with little to no emphasis on diplomatic efforts for peace. The United States deterred diplomatic solutions in Ukraine and consistently rejected peace offers and diplomatic initiatives proposed by Russia since 2014. In a 2014 interview, the late Stephen Cohen, Professor Emeritus of Politics and Director of Russian Studies at Princeton University, recalled that it was the European Union, backed by

Washington, that pressured the democratically elected president of Ukraine to choose between Europe and Russia, despite the country being deeply divided (Cohen, 2014).

Since the war erupted on February 24th, the United States has been noticeably absent from negotiations and has shown minimal opposition to it. About a month after the war began, there was a faint hope for a ceasefire and diplomatic resolution. A proposal for a diplomatic settlement was put forward, which included the idea of Ukraine remaining neutral. However, the United States did not endorse or support this proposal, nor did it offer any proposals of its own. Instead, the Biden administration continued to send military aid packages to sustain the fighting, while asserting that it was impossible to trust Russia (Massoudi, 2022).

In another statement by Department of State spokesperson Ned Price, it was suggested that Ukraine should not strike a deal with Russia that could potentially bring an end to the war, particularly on the issue of Ukraine's potential NATO membership. He discouraged and impeded Kyiv from negotiating on the central issue of Ukraine's refusal to join NATO, as he emphasized that the sovereignty of Ukraine was of paramount importance (Price, 2022).

The main goal of the West is to keep Russia involved in the war for as long as possible, causing economic and military damage, like the Soviet Union's involvement in Afghanistan. Despite the significant support and weaponry provided to Ukraine, Russia remains superior and dominates the eastern region, steadily approaching their objectives. However, the continued war will drain and exhaust both sides, with the outcome determined by the level of importance placed on Ukraine by the West and the extent to which they are willing to support it. For Russia, the matter is a question of life and death, and Putin will do whatever it takes to prevent the threat from reaching Russia's doorstep.

4.2 The Role of Sanctions

Russia has faced sanctions since 2014 when it annexed Crimea, and additional severe sanctions were imposed when it commenced its military operation in February 2022. These sanctions include banning Russia from the global financial telecommunication system known as SWIFT, freezing assets of Russia's central bank, restricting access to dollar reserves, limiting energy imports, halting financial transactions, and suspending shipments of critical imports such as semiconductors and electronics (Vermeiren, 2022).

The U.S. and the European Union pulled out and closed their major companies and firms that were operating in the Russian market, and imposed restrictions on businesses and individuals from importing, purchasing, or transferring goods to and from Russia. A series of sanctions were continuously imposed on Russia with the aim of achieving strategic objectives, including causing a cash flow and balance-of-payments crisis in Russia in the short run. These sanctions were intended to make it challenging for Russia to finance its military operations in Ukraine.

The sanctions imposed on Russia had a significant impact on the oil market, which was contrary to what the West had expected. Despite being heavily sanctioned by the United States, Europe, and a few other countries, Russia still maintains access to a significant portion of the global market. This is because many other countries around the world have not followed suit with imposing sanctions and continue to engage in trade and business with Russia (Sajadi, 2022). Russia has emerged as a major crude oil supplier to countries like China and India in Asia. In 2022, China's imports of Russian crude oil surged by 55% compared to the previous year, making Russia the top supplier of crude oil to China. Similarly, India, another major energy consumer in Asia, has also increased its imports of Russian crude oil (Aizhu, 2022). India has emerged as a prominent buyer of oil cargoes from the Atlantic that Europe is no longer interested in purchasing. With its large population, India has sought out discounted oil supplies, making it a good deal for the country. Following the invasion and ongoing conflict, India has become a significant purchaser of Russian energy, acquiring discounted oil products that have been shunned by Europe and the US (Chakraborty, 2022). Saudi Arabia, traditionally seen as a key ally of the United States, has shifted its stance, and strengthened ties with Russia.

This is evident in their joint decision, along with other oil-producing allies, to reduce oil production by more than 1.2 million barrels per day, which accounts for over 1 percent of global supplies (Krauss, 2023). This move is aimed at increasing oil prices, which goes against the interests of the United States and Europe. Despite efforts by the U.S. and Europe to convince Saudi Arabia to increase oil production to pressure the Russian economy, the response has been to the contrary, benefiting Russia.

5. Conclusion

The war in Ukraine it has started in February 2014 when the regime of Victor Yanukovich was overthrown with the support of the West to implement a pro-western government. The neutrality

policy is broken off, the Russians were not proposing to embrace Ukraine as part of their sphere of influence, their plea for neutralization faced significant rejection, stemming from a combination of triumphalism, Russophobia, and a desire to weaken Russia's position. Ukraine demanded NATO membership and welcomed billions of dollars of arms shipment from the US starting in 2014 and Ukraine had been trained, reorganized and re equipped to NATO standards by the United States and other countries and this was a concern to Russia. this war going into its 9th year, came from a collision between two nuclear powers. Russia has consistently maintained that NATO's expansion, particularly the inclusion of Ukraine, poses an existential threat to their country. Since 2008, Russia has expressed this concern, but the West, particularly the United States, has not only rejected this notion but has also created an alternative narrative. According to this narrative, the current situation is not a result of NATO's expansion, but rather a consequence of Putin's expansionist ambitions to recreate the Soviet Union.

Neutrality status of Ukraine could have saved the country from this catastrophic war, especially when Russia sent an alert by mobilizing their army on the border of Ukraine, came in the context of a demand for a negotiation on European security framework and reassuring to Russia that weaponry would not be placed in Ukraine. The United States policy, instead of reconsidering and understanding Russia's perspective that NATO expansion may be the root cause of the problem, has doubled down on making Ukraine a de facto NATO member. Rather than actively fighting alongside Ukraine, the U.S. has chosen to arm and train them with aid and military assistance to resist Russia, with a primary objective of weakening the Russian economy and military. Diplomatic efforts have taken a back seat, and the focus has been on escalating the conflict rather than seeking diplomatic solutions.

The difference in power between Russia and Ukraine is quite significant when we consider their military capabilities and resources, Despite the support and military assistance from NATO members, the Ukrainian side hasn't been able to achieve significant results (Cooper, 2023). After more than 500 days the Ukrainian army still facing challenges in reclaiming control of the territories that have come under Russian authority in eastern Ukraine. In reality, this war has inflicted significant damage on Ukraine, making it unlikely for the country to join NATO, it is not going to retain its territorial integrity which it could have had under the Minsk accords, t's worrisome to think that Ukraine may lose control of its Black Sea coast as a consequence of this

war., The war has resulted in a significant loss of lives for Ukraine, with an estimated one-fourth to one-third of its population who fled the country, and it has been ravaged with much of its infrastructure damaged by Russian attacks. As a result, it's very likely that Ukraine will face significantly worse consequences after this conflict compared to what it could have experienced if it had chosen to remain neutral.

6. Recommendations

The conflict's ongoing nature creates an endless cycle of violence, instability, and economic hardship not only for the parties who are directly involved but also for countries nearby and the worldwide community as a whole and disrupted the dynamics of geopolitics. The war has already resulted in thousands of deaths, displacement of millions of people, and serious humanitarian consequences. It is of utmost importance that the global community intensifies its endeavors to enhance the search for a harmonious and mutually agreed-upon resolution to the ongoing conflict. Giving precedence to diplomatic initiatives, open dialogue, and mediation is essential to effectively conclude hostilities and reinstate stability in the region, particularly the focus was on upholding Ukraine's neutrality status, an idea proposed by former President Viktor Yanukovich, and working towards the objectives outlined in the Minsk accord. Such a viable settlement would not only positively impact Ukraine and Russia but also serve to safeguard the integrity of the international order and mitigate potential disruptions to the global system.

References:

- Arco, I., Bargués, P., Bourekba, M., Burguete, V., Claudin, C., Colomina, C., Fernández de Losada, A., Morillas, P., & Pasetti, F. (2023). One year since Russia invaded Ukraine. Notes internacionales CIDOB, 1-5. <https://doi.org/10.24241/notesint.2023/285/en>
- Cooper, J. (2023). Another budget for a country at war: Military expenditure in Russia's federal budget for 2024 and beyond. <https://doi.org/10.55163/xroi1465>
- Parezanović, M. (2022). Russian special operation in Crimea in 2014. *Politika nacionalne bezbednosti*, 23(2/2022), 49-65. <https://doi.org/10.22182/pnb.2322022.3>
- Ryabushkin, D. S. (2022). Crimean Events of 2014: Causes, Chronology, Consequences. *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 35(1), 115-142. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2022.2045803>
- ALJAZEERA. (2014). Ukraine separatists declare independence. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/5/12/ukraine-separatists-declare-independence>

- Asmus, R. (2010). *A Little War that Shook the World – Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- BBC. (2013). Ukraine protests after Yanukovich EU deal rejection. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25162563>
- Chakraborty, D. M., & Chakraborty, D. (2022). China and India Funnel \$24 Billion to Putin in Energy Spree. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-06/china-and-india-funnel-24-billion-to-putin-with-energy-spree?leadSource=verify%20wall>
- Cohen, J. (2018). Commentary: Ukraine's neo-Nazi problem. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cohen-ukraine-commentary-idUSKBN1GV2TY>
- Cohen, S. (2014). A New Cold War? Ukraine Violence Escalates, Leaked Tape Suggests U.S. Was Plotting Coup. https://www.democracynow.org/2014/2/20/a_new_cold_war_ukraine_violence
- CVCE.eu. (2016). The Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany. <https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/df06517b-babc-451d-baf6-a2d4b19c1c88/efe51364-e699-4d53-92ff-fe24f37e4d40>
- David Brunnstrom, S. C. (2008). REUTERS. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-idUSL0179714620080403>
- Gidathubli, R. G. (2004). Expansion of NATO: Russia's Dilemma. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 1885-1887.
- Group, I. C. (2022). Conflict in Ukraine's Donbas: A Visual Explainer. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/conflict-ukraines-donbas-visual-explainer>
- Group, P. o. t. r. o. c. o. t. T. C. (2014). Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, signed in Minsk, 5 September 2014. <https://www.osce.org/home/123257>
- Kovalik, D. (2022). Why Russia's intervention in Ukraine is legal under international law. <https://www.rt.com/russia/554166-international-law-military-operation-ukraine/>
- Kozyrev, A. (2002). “Стратегия партнерства (Strategy of partnership). *Внешняя политика и безопасность современной России (Foreign policy and security of contemporary Russia)*, 182-192.
- Krauss, C. (2023). In Surprise, OPEC Plus Announces Cut in Oil Production. <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/02/business/opec-plus-oil-production.html#:~:text=Saudi%20Arabia%2C%20Russia%20and%20their,apparent%20effort%20to%20increase%20prices.>
- Malyarenko, D. J. G., & Malyarenko, T. (2019). Evolving Dynamics of Societal Security and the Potential for Conflict in Eastern Ukraine. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 209-237.
- Marsden, C. (2014). Poroshenko launches bloody assault on eastern Ukraine. <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/07/02/ukra-j02.html>
- Massoudi, M. S. R. O. A. (2022). Ukraine and Russia explore neutrality plan in peace talks. <https://www.ft.com/content/7b341e46-d375-4817-be67-802b7fa77ef1>

- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. *Foreign Affairs*, 77-84, 85-89.
- Petro, N. N. (2015). Understanding the Other Ukraine: Identity and Allegiance in Russophone Ukraine. *E-International Relations*.
- Price, N. (2022). Department Press Briefing. <https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-march-21-2022/>
- Sajadi, D. M. (2022). The Russia-Ukraine War: Shaking the Foundation of the Global System. *Euroasian journal of Management and Social Sciences*, 3(3), 34-47.
- Sarotte, M. E. (2014). A Broken Promise? What the West Really Told Moscow About NATO Expansion. *Council on Foreign Relations*, 90-97.
- Tracker, U. S. (2022). Ukraine Support Tracker. <https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/>
- Traynor, I. (2007). Putin hits at US for triggering arms race. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/feb/11/usa.russia>
- Vermeiren, M. (2022). Freezing Russia's Central Bank Reserves: Much Ado About Nothing?. https://www.ugent.be/ps/politiekewetenschappen/gies/en/gies_papers/2022-ukraine/freezing-russias-central-bank-reserves-much-ado-about-nothing
- Wittke, C. (2019). The Minsk Agreements – more